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ABSTRACT 
 
What do a piece of plumbing pipe, some wire netting, some adhesive tape, two loops of nylon webbing 
and a carabiner have in common? Nothing, until they are assembled, in a design. In turn, the object 
these components comprise comes into being only with the presence of human beings. These are the 
components of a device known as a ‘lock-on’; some sundry objects that you would find in a builders’ 
merchant and some people’s bodies – peace activists pursuing non-violent direct action. Peace 
activists use lock-ons to join themselves together by the arms to enhance the power of their passive 
resistance. This paper identifies a number of theoretical approaches to objects of this sort. It is 
intended to initiate a discussion of the lock-on as an example of an ‘indigenous’ design that has 
appeared without professional designers, evolving as part of the practice of peace protest.  
 
As well as considering the way that the lock-on may have evolved, referring to Langrish's (2004) 
analysis of design in terms of Darwinian evolution, the paper refers to 'practice' in the sense found in 
the sociological study of culture, in the work of Bourdieu (1977) and others, summed up recently by 
Reckwitz (2002). Drawing as it does from a range of sources, including the social study of technology, 
‘practice theory’ seems to have a good deal to offer a conception of design that seeks to influence the 
world positively beyond the point of sale. In common with other recent strands in design research such 
as the Participative Design that has grown out of the study of human computer interaction, practice 
theory acknowledges that our relationships to objects are socially important. Together with cultural 
knowledge and embodied skill objects form ‘compounds’ with people that evolve through time (Shove 
2006). 
 
This paper raises the possibility that the transforming power of designing may be enhanced if it is 
acknowledged that it is most powerful when it takes place in full articulation with practices. This 
principle is inscribed in contemporary 'user oriented' design process, but the lock-on is an extreme 
example of it, since no professional designers are involved in its production and its social purpose is 
not commercial but political. Politically engaged design is often directed at issues of sustainability and 
work with NGOs and these contexts for designing may be the closest in kind to that which has produced 
the lock-on.  
 
A ‘practice orientated’ approach to design might be able to engage with the full relationship between 
things and the agents they imply, their bodies, their minds, the knowledge they have, the emotions they 
feel, the discourses they engage with. For this reason it seems to be a useful framework through which 
to understand an object like the lock on which has emerged out of an identifiable practice. The nature 
of this practice may also be inspiring in itself, as in this example, which works against weapons of mass 
destruction. The paper offers an initial analysis of the evolution and current use of the 'lock-on' in UK 
non violent direct action as an example of an indigenous design that is part of a practice and indicates 
the potential for further research that would seek more fully to understand the history and development 
of the lock-on to both test the applicability of practice theory and to seek insights into human/ object 
relationships in other contexts.  
 
 
 
 
"Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a 
community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks 
so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored." (King, 2000: 77) 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
This paper considers ways of understanding a type of thing, which is clearly a design 
because it works, but does not develop through the activities of professional designers. It 
considers theory from archaeology and design to discuss the ‘lock-on’ that is used in non 
violent direct action. It considers how such an object might have come into existence and 
discusses its use by peace activists in the UK, especially those who protest against nuclear 
weapons at Faslane, Scotland, where Britain’s armed forces keep the UK’s nuclear bombs. 
The paper intends only to open a discussion, not to present definitive conclusions about this 
object, or what understanding it might tell us about either design theory or archaeology. The 
paper briefly describes the history and current use of the lock-on, introduces some theoretical 
approaches that might be helpful in understanding it, and notes their possible consequences. 
While this discussion may be interesting in the context of theories of human/ object 
relationships, the facts that motivate those who over the decades have contributed to the 
design of the lock-on are compelling in themselves.  
 
Britain currently has four nuclear missile submarines and up to 165 warheads. Each 
warhead has the destructive power of up to seven of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima in 
1945; therefore Britain has at its disposal one thousand one hundred and fifty times the 
destructive power of that bomb, which, along with the one dropped on Nagasaki, killed three 
hundred and fifty thousand people, the great majority of whom were civilians. The 
international court of justice ruled in 1996 that the threat to use nuclear weapons would be 
illegal under international law. It is facts such as these which motivate peace protest and 
therefore the design of lock-ons. For peace activists ‘locking on’ means using their bodies, 
and some everyday hardware, to disrupt the normal running of part of the military machine 
with the objective of making nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction an 
‘issue that can no longer be ignored’ as Martin Luther King put it. Locking on has a relatively 
long history. From the late nineteenth century suffragettes chained themselves to railings in 
public places as they campaigned for equal democratic rights with men. Campaigners have 
chained themselves to a bewildering variety of inanimate objects as part of different protest 
campaigns since then. Among the most notable of these in the UK have been campaigns by 
environmentalists against road developments. 
 
This paper mainly refers to one of the variety of configurations of materials used by 
peace campaigners to lock themselves onto things and each other. It consists of a piece of 
150mm diameter plastic pipe a bit shorter than two human arms, a piece of nylon webbing or 
climbing rope and a karabiner – a quick release hook used by climbers – as well as the bodies 
of two participants.  To lock themselves together, each protestor puts one arm into the tube, 
joining themselves together by the wrist using the rope and carabiner.  The police can not get 
to their hands to separate them without cutting the pipe, but they can release themselves if 
they wish.   Despite its having human components when in use, and only coming into 
existence when it is used, campaigners do refer to this configuration of pipe, webbing and 
carabiner as a lock-on. In direct actions the lock-on makes passive resistance to being moved 
out of the way more effective, since protestors are joined together in groups. The security 
forces can separate them against their will but only by cutting through the thick plastic of the 
pipe to get at the karabiner. They use saws to do this and presumably for this reason the tube 
is sometims covered with wire netting and then industrial tape to keep its construction 
concealed and increase the time it takes to forcibly unlock the participants.  
 
As well as being the product of a non-professional design process, the lock-on might 
seem like an unusual sort of object to consider in the academic study of design because it is 
not a discrete object but is made up of people’s bodies along with its inanimate components. 
To exist it requires the presence of the bodies of the peace campaigners who use it to 
‘blockade’ a military site. The lock-on clearly is ‘a design’, however, it does not seem to have 
been ‘designed’ in the sense the term is understood in manufacturing or the design profession; 
it seems to have grown up as part of the practice of non violent direct action. To this extent it 
can be thought of as ‘indigenous’ because it is a design that belongs to and has grown out of 
the groups that use it. 
 
Design theory can provide some insights into the way the lock-on design may have 
come about. It may have some things in common with what Christopher Alexander (1964) 
calls a ‘traditional’ as opposed to a ‘modern’ design process, in which objects change and 
develop through small improvements that progressively make them a better fit with the 
‘problem field’ that brings them into existence. In this case, the problem field consists of 
finding a configuration for the lock-on that will be easy to put on, will be easy to get off 
should the need arise, will baffle the police as to its construction for as long as possible, will 
be difficult and time consuming to break into, will be portable and will be cheap. Finally, and 
in this characteristic the lock-on conforms quite closely to Alexander’s ‘traditional’ type of 
design, its configuration needs to be able to respond over time to the setting in which it is 
used. Because the lock-on only comes fully into existence when it is used, this aspect of the 
process of its ‘design’ involves modifications not only to its inanimate components but also 
its human ones. Participants in an action design the use of the lock-on by considering how 
many should lock together, where they should do so, how they will use diversions and the 
element of surprise. A lock-on is anything but an inanimate object – it is part of a process of 
use, which is in turn part of a wider practice. Because of this, the lock-on has come to exist 
through a process and is therefore also not ‘modern’ in another sense that Alexander’s 
analysis proposes in that it is not individualistic but is a configuration that has grown out of 
various types of collective political activism. 1 
 
Having identified a relationship between the lock-on and design theory (Alexander 
1964), the discussion that follows considers what sort of ‘thing’ a lock-on might be and what 
frameworks exist that might help to understand it. It refers to a further theoretical strand in 
Design to consider the ‘performative’ nature of the lock-on (Pine and Gilmour 1999) and to 
determine whether the lock on can be said to have evolved (Langrish 2004). The discussion 
then considers whether work in Archaeology may help to understand the relationship between 
the lock-on and its ‘designers’, identifying approaches that seek to understand artefacts as part 
of specific cultural practices (Conkey 1990). The discussion then focuses on work in 
Sociology that takes cultural practices to be the ‘site of the social’ (Reckwitz 2002) and which 
acknowledges the significance of objects in such practices (Kopytoff 1986, Shove 1995 & 
2005). This discussion intends to point up principles which may be applied to designs that 
work as part of other practices and which might facilitate changes in those practices and to 
identify further work on the lock-on, and other similar artefacts that might clarify these 
principles. 
 
WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING THE LOCK-ON AS A 
DESIGN 
 
First it is appropriate to identify the processes and agents through which this object 
has changed by briefly considering how the lock-on has come to its present form in the 
practice of non violent direct action. A complete understanding of the development of lock-on 
devices since the early C20 would require ethnographic and historical work which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Also, given the close relationship between the specific design of a 
lock-on device and the time and place it is to be used, such an enquiry might not uncover a 
progressive ‘development’ of the form. However, we can get some useful insights into how 
lock-ons work by noting their variety and their relationship to the groups of people that 
produce them. 
 
Central to these insights is the fact that a lock-on does not exist as a discrete object 
but is a manifestation of the process of non violent direct action, a ‘locking-on’ rather than a 
‘lock-on’. It is a verb rather than a noun. This observation could imply a relationship to the 
recent business theories that emphasise dematerialised services, sold as ‘experiences’ (Pine 
and Gilmour 1999). However, the fact that the lock-on is not provided in the usual 
commercial sense makes it a different case from those personalised experiences which are 
apparently the basis of contemporary service-based economies. 
 
To the extent that it is an object, a lock-on device has more in common with things 
we might make ourselves to wear than objects with which we have a more distanced physical 
relationship and which we buy already made. Like clothes, the ways in which lock-ons are 
worn, their design in use, seem to have both practical and symbolic aspects. These two 
aspects can also coexist in the way that a lock-on device is made to look, as one of the keys to 
a successful locking-on is to deceive the police into ignoring the lock-on device until it is too 
late for them to stop it being used. One tactic is to disguise the lock-on tubes as something 
else. At its most creative, such disguise can involve transforming an apparently innocent 
object into a lock-on – wheelchairs and Zimmer frames are useful for this (Rundberg, 2006: 
4). 
 
Other aspects of the appearance of lock-on devices are more conventionally symbolic, 
such as painting the tubes with the checker pattern that is part of our collective image of a 
nuclear missile, or a policeman’s hat.2 The idea that these lock-on devices have developed in 
some sense over time is attractive even if it may only be possible in principle to clearly 
understand quite short periods in their development. Langrish's review of the principles of 
biological evolution identifies which of them might be applied to design and helps to work 
out the extent to which evolutionary ideas may be applied to the practice of locking-on and 
lock-on devices. Langrish rejects Lamarckian evolution as an explanation for changes in 
designs on the basis that this explanation constructs design as a process of striving for success 
in a future that can’t be known. He uses the unintended consequences of designs as the basis 
for his transfer of Darwinian selection to the world of artefacts – it is the unintended 
consequences of today’s designs that give us ideas for tomorrow’s designs. As he stresses, it 
is not designed objects that evolve – like any organism, a particular design has to live out its 
life with the specification it was ‘born’ with, more or less. To the extent that designs can be 
said to evolve, this process takes place at a level that is equivalent to the genetic code that 
defines organisms. A particular object may be modified, but this does not usually constitute a 
revision to its design. Borrowing from Dawkins, Langrish identifies designs as equivalent to 
‘memes’ – culturally reproduced codes. This offers a neo-Darwinian view of design change as 
'natural selection plus memes, their competition, their modes of transfer, and their 
transformation' (Langrish 2004: 12).  
 
Langrish suggests that there are three types of design memes, ‘selectemes’ that are 
ideas about what to make, ‘explanemes’ that are ideas about why these are the right things to 
make and ‘recipemes’ that are ideas about how to make things. The lock-on as a process/ 
object involves all these types of ideas and they are mutually inter-dependent, indeed it may 
be rather difficult to distinguish between these types of idea in the whole phenomenon of 
locking-on as part of non violent direct action. Ideas about ‘what to make’, or selectemes, 
interact deeply with ideas about how to make things, or recipemes, in the context of particular 
actions. Indeed, given the nature of the lock on as an entity that only exists once enacted it is 
not clear whether ‘what to make’ in this case indicates a thing or a political intervention. Also 
the scale of this ‘making’ is not easy to pin down, since it can be taken to indicate both 
making a specific arrangement of materials outside a particular nuclear site as well as making 
an increase in consciousness at a national, or international, level. The same ‘explaneme’ is 
likely to be invoked by a protester talking to a policeman who tries to separate them from 
some piece of hardware they have locked on to as is used in public debate – that nuclear 
weapons are illegal under international law. 
 
Clearly memes, which in Langrish’s evolutionary view are the ‘replicators’, or 
patterns that cause designs to persist, exist in both professional design and in non professional 
contexts that produce designs such as non violent direct action. So to observe that lock-ons 
have evolved is not to differentiate them in principle from mainstream design. Also, Langrish 
does not restrict ‘replicators’ in this case to mean the patterns of ideas an individual alone can 
work with, which allows such ideas to be distributed in documents, representations and 
objects - it is not possible for an individual to hold all the details of even a simple design in 
their head. Just like a conventional design, the ‘pattern’ of a lock-on is transmitted through 
formal means such as training workshops as well as through text (Faslane365, 2006, and see 
figure 1.). However, Michael Polanyi (1966) argued that a good proportion of the knowledge 
we operate with as designers and in everyday life is ‘tacit’, and is enacted in our embodied 
relationship with the world. In this case of the lock-on this tacit, embodied, knowledge is 
diffused among the groups of activists who employ it as a tactic for direct action and it is 
enacted most powerfully through participating in actions.  
 
These facts indicate that the designing of the lock on device has taken place within 
the processes of doing non violent direct actions, in their planning and execution and their 
evolution. Just as a design once produced can be modified only up to a point before it must be 
re-designed, a locking on action that is planned - designed - and then enacted can only be 
modified up to a point in the face of the police tactics that the participants find confronting 
them. Although peace activists prepare for and plan actions meticulously, they are necessarily 
working with an unknown future, as Langrish observes is the case in conventional designing. 
They cannot be sure their plan will be feasible or predict the reaction of the security forces to 
their action. Some modification of a plan is possible on the day, but the collective nature of 
non violent protest means that what is learned from a particular action can be effectively 
shared and fed into the design of future actions, and future lock ons. 
 
This sharing of experience will affect the details of future actions, but it takes place 
against a background of collective knowledge and values that probably change more slowly. 
Because the relationship of the lock on to these other factors that make up the phenomenon of 
peace activism is based on a tacit understanding of how peace activism works, it may have 
some similarity to other forms of shared behaviour that have both material and cultural 
aspects. The tactic of locking on, and the knowledge that exists about why and how to do it, 
and what devices are good for it, are part of the cultural, material and embodied practice of 
non violent direct action. They are among the characteristics of what Bourdieu (1984) calls 
the habitus of the people who make up this group. To some extent these aspects of non violent 
direct action go without saying for peace activists. The lock-on is an enacted principle which 
is available to individuals by virtue of their belonging to the group. They become skilled in its 
use by absorbing the mores and values of the group as well as through explicit learning. 
 
‘SOCIAL PRACTICE’ AS A THEORETICAL 
APPROACH TO THE LOCK ON. 
 
This close relationship between the process of locking-on and the way that non 
violent direct action works as a group phenomenon seems to be fundamental to the character 
of the lock-on as an artefact. This is what makes it somewhat unfamiliar, different in both its 
form and the process of its development from the type of object that designers, design 
theorists and design academics are usually concerned with.  
 
Although other objects, such as spectacles and automobiles, function as lock-ons do 
only with the addition of a human body, artefacts like these also have a discrete character 
separate from the human bodies that ‘activate’ them. Part of the value of spectacles and cars 
depends on their symbolic ‘content’ – they are more or less fashionable for example and are 
so whether or not they are being worn or being driven. This seems not to be the case with 
lock-ons, since they fully exist only for the action for which they have been designed and in 
combination with the activists’ bodies. 
 
This fact alone may not constitute a significant difference between the lock-on and 
more conventional artefacts – indeed it is possible to think of other artefacts whose form 
develops as part of a collective enterprise. It is now conventional for new product 
development to at least take account of the characteristics of the intended market for a 
product, if not to base the development process on the emergent characteristics of that market 
captured by research techniques borrowed from anthropology (see Holbrook 1996, Waymire 
and Hall 1995: 41). In a parallel development, theoretical approaches to the design of 
computer technology have taken a ‘turn to practice’ which acknowledges the situated nature 
of experiences with technology (McCarthy and Wright 2004). However, the ‘indigenous’ 
nature of the lock-on and the fundamental interweaving of the development of the device and 
the nature of the groups that have developed it make it different from even such apparently 
market/ user orientated commercial products, though whether this makes the process of its 
origination fundamentally different from conventional design processes is at this point an 
open question.  
 
Archaeologists have been aware of the intimate relationship between designs and the 
cultures that give rise to them, especially so since they began questioning what Conkey calls 
the ‘culture history’ approach to understanding artefacts. Whereas hitherto archaeologists had 
acted as if objects could ‘stand in’ for a culture, from the 1960s they aspired to unpick the 
multi-determined nature of artefacts and their complex mutually determining relationship to 
their setting. As Conkey puts it:  
 
Design is much more than that which is applied to a pot; it is the most essential set of 
processes that bring form into existence. All artifacts and all cultural production are the result 
of a series of - or a 'pathway' through - mental and manual processes set in and defined by a 
historical and social framework. (Conkey 1990: 13) 
 
It is notable for this discussion that her perspective starts from the premise that 
‘design’ means what identifies a type of artefact and allows it to be positioned in a typology 
by virtue of its formal relationship to the design of other artefacts, rather than meaning a 
professional, commercial process that results in artefacts, though it allows for both meanings. 
She acknowledges that it is practices – 'mental and manual processes set in and defined by a 
historical and social framework' – that result in objects with particular form and refers to the 
notion of ‘praxis’ found in Marx and Bourdieu. She suggests that we can only understand 
objects if we think of them ‘as praxis, as productions, as symbolic acts in their own right’. 
This thought is echoed in more recent work on consumption in sociology and anthropology, 
for example Miller’s counterpoising of a theoretical/ semiotic approach to the analysis of 
consumption with an empirical/ ethnographic approach (1995, 1997). Seen in this way, 
production for Conkey is a ‘constitutive endeavour’. The production of the lock-on is part of a 
collective endeavour that shifts and changes through time and space and constitutes the 
practice of non violent direct action as well as being constituted by it. 
 
Considered in this way, the somewhat unfamiliar, perhaps bizarre, character of the 
lock-on may help to shed light on the way that more ‘mainstream’ artefacts come into being 
and how they might change to further aims besides the creation of profit. If the fact that the 
lock-on changes as a consequence of changes in the practice of peace activism is accepted as 
a principle for artefact change more generally and in more ‘mainstream’ settings, then 
changes to other types of object are likely to rely on changes to practices. This point has not 
been lost on those interested in working out how to modify practices that are arguably 
unsustainable in environmental terms. Sociologist Elizabeth Shove, for instance, has studied 
the way that everyday practices such as laundry, bathing and the heating and cooling of 
houses have grown up and the elements that keep them in existence in their current form in 
the developed world (2005).  
 
Drawing from sociological and anthropological studies of technology Shove inspects 
the premise that societies and technologies ‘co-evolve’ – citing Kopytoff’s assertion that 
societies ‘simultaneously and in the same way construct objects as they construct people’ 
(Kopytoff 1986: 90). She suggests that there are three dimensions to the co-evolution of 
people and technologies made up of relationships between ‘sociotechnical systems’ that are 
‘collective conventions and arrangements’, the ‘habits, practices and expectations of users and 
consumers’ and the ‘symbolic and material qualities of sociotechnical devices/ objects’ 
(Shove 1995: 48). This allows her to consider the material and the symbolic aspects of 
technologies as well as the ways in which they ‘stabilise’ as large scale structures and are 
appropriated at a local level. So in her analysis of bathing she is able to make a relationship 
between the domestic technical arrangements we live with every day, the infrastructure that 
provides us with the means to make these arrangements work and, crucially, the very 
powerful sets of ideas that motivate us to clean ourselves in the particular ways that we do. 
What is notable in her account is the coherence with which she integrates these elements of 
bathing and traces the ways in which they change over time. 
 
Shove’s account has in this respect a good deal in common with the much more 
abstract body of theory that can be found in contemporary sociology that engages with ‘social 
practices’. Andreas Reckwitz writes an overview of this ‘practice theory’ in sociology 
(Reckwitz 2002). He suggests that this way of thinking about the social offers an alternative 
view of human actions to that offered by other strands of thought. In his view, culture is the 
‘site of the social’ and he distinguishes practice theory from theories of culture that emphasise 
mind, discourse and interaction (2002: 241). Reckwitz sums up a ‘practice’ as 
 
‘A routinised type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to 
one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a 
background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and 
motivational knowledge.’ (Reckwitz 2002: 251) 
 
It is characteristic of practices that these elements are interconnected and ‘carried’ by 
individuals, in whom many different practices intersect. They are sustained, not by norms or 
rational choices, but by routines - habits as it were – which are embodied routines that draw 
on ‘knowledge’ that can be either explicit or based in emotion. They change through 
‘ruptures’ in the routines that sustain them.  
 
Despite its theoretical abstraction, Reckwitz’ account of practice theory points 
towards some quite down to earth aspects of humans’ relationships to the material world. In a 
parallel to the principle that mind and body can’t be distinguished in a practice, in this view 
human interactions with particular physical things are built into the meaning of practices. 
Echoing writers in the sociology of technology tradition such as Latour (1992, 2000), 
Reckwitz proposes that things ‘mould’ activities. Things ‘…enable and limit certain bodily 
and mental activities, certain knowledge and understanding as elements of practices’ (2002: 
253). In contrast to views of human object relationships that stress their discursive and 
symbolic content, in this view the materiality of objects, how they ‘handle’, constitutes the 
‘forms of behaviour’ of which they are part.  
 
Practices depend on knowledge and motivations – we have to know what to do and 
we have to want to do it. This knowledge includes but surpasses explicit ‘knowing that’ and 
includes ‘aesthetic’ knowledge, feeling, emotion. Knowledge held in our feelings lets us 
know what to do in a situation or with a thing.3 Knowledge in a practice ‘…embraces ways of 
understanding, knowing how, ways of wanting and of feeling that are linked to each other 
within practice (Reckwitz 2002: 253).’ This compound of different forms of knowledge 
includes an understanding of the values that may motivate the practice as well as how to act in 
accordance with them that is made evident through feelings, a certain ‘emotionality’. 
Emotions are therefore practice-specific; they define, and reproduce the practice. 
 
AN ARTEFACT IN THE PRACTICE OF NON VIOLENT 
DIRECT ACTION 
 
The development of lock-on devices and of the ways they are used in non violent 
direct action set out above seems to fit rather well with the features of social practices that 
Reckwitz identifies. It is reasonable to class non violent direct action in peace activism as a 
‘practice’ in this sense;4 it is collective; it operates according to shared routines; it involves 
specific (disobedient) bodily activities; it is motivated by knowledge of the illegality of ‘our’ 
weapons of mass destruction; this knowledge is felt as a passionate desire for action; it is 
based on an understanding that collective political protest can effect change. Most relevant for 
this discussion however, non violent direct action involves the development and use of 
particular artefacts – for locking on. 
 
The lock-on in non violent direct action is a perfect example of an artefact that is part 
of a practice. The physical transgression of accepted behaviour that locking on requires draws 
on a tradition of dissent that has deep roots in British political and cultural life; a long 
established practice. Locking on is very obviously embodied and the way the lock-on device 
‘handles’ both in its materiality and in the discourse of power and resistance that it ‘speaks’ is 
crucial to the practice itself. The routines of non violent direct action change in response to 
‘ruptures’ provided by the security forces that result in changes to many elements of the 
practice – changes to the lock-on devices themselves being only the most visible of these. The 
tactics in which lock-ons are employed change in response to modifications in the knowledge 
that is brought to the practice. 
 
The lock-on device could be almost too perfect an example of an artefact that is part 
of a cultural practice. It would be possible to dismiss practice theory as a useful starting point 
for thinking about designs on the grounds that while the lock-on fits the theory very closely it 
only does so because it is a pathological rather than normative design in social terms. Such a 
criticism might point to the usefulness of an approach to designs that stresses their symbolic 
character, appealing to the well developed body of theory that stresses the symbolic aspect of 
our relationship to artefacts in consumption (Baudrillard 1993) and design (Krippendorff 
2005).5 
 
Such a criticism might derive from a political judgement that rests on a view of the 
proper ‘ends’ for designing and different political positions will result in different evaluations 
of this point. It might also relate to the question of the appropriate definition of ‘design 
theory, since, if Alexander’s definition of ‘modern’ design is the only one considered 
acceptable it would be possible to argue that the lock-on has not properly been designed at all. 
If the only proper ends for designing are the creation of profit, then yes, the pathological 
character of the lock-on makes it an unfit model. If design is understood to be an activity 
circumscribed by its professional definition then the lock-on is a similarly unfit example. 
 
However, it is possible to see in Shove’s analysis of practices on the level of 
interlocking social, cultural and material systems an urgent purpose for alternative ways of 
understanding designs and designing, similar to those adopted in the ‘participative’ design 
tradition (Ehn and Kyng 1991), but with the more radical purpose of exploring the potential to 
use this understanding to modify practices in the service of, for instance, environmental 
sustainability. The ‘practice oriented’ approach outlined above in relation to the lock-on has 
the potential to provide sufficient understanding of these systems to allow them to be changed 
by policy, and by practice oriented designing. Understanding material things requires 
understanding practices. Given that practices and things are mutually constitutive, changing 
things might accompany changing practices. 
 
The discussion above implies further work that would make it possible to more 
confidently specify the insights the lock-on, and other indigenous designs, can provide. A 
more complete historical/ ethnographic study of the way the design has come about, and how 
it changes, would be a very significant element in this work. This would make it possible, for 
instance, to ascertain whether the group organisation involved in non-violent direct action and 
the development of lock-ons was equivalent to, or significantly different from, the 
organisation of the participative and community based design traditions that appear to be its 
closest relations. With an opposite disciplinary orientation, such a study would also make it 
possible to determine the significance of the lock-on for sociological theories of human/ 
object relationships. 
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1 Although Alexander offers a stereotype of the modern designer as someone who works alone, 
contemporary design processes do not necessarily conform to this individualistic pattern. However 
some of the characteristics of Alexander’s ‘modern’ design process are found in the commercial 
production of contemporary artefacts. These are often individualised through a brand, and sometimes 
through the identity of a named designer, for all that there are now conventionally many players in any 
process of new product development including teams of designers.  
2 Although lock-ons do have symbolic content, the fact that its purpose is to confuse the opposition, 
rather than to maximise their ease of their use puts them in a particular relationship to the application of 
theories of language to design found, for instance, in the writing of Klaus Krippendorff (2005). The 
exact nature of this relationship warrants further research, particularly the way in which their symbolic 
content is subversive not normative.  
3 In this sense, social practices have something in common with the memes that Langrish discusses - 
they are patterns that guide our actions, which replicate and aspects of which may mutate.  As Langrish 
points out however (1999), the transmission of memes through time is not restricted to cultural means.  
4 One feature of practice theory that is not immediately clear is the grounds for naming a particular 
activity as a practice, rather than its components, or activities of which it is a part. It seems reasonable 
to assume that sociologists would base this classification on the activity having social significance – 
being a genuine ‘site of the social’. However it is not clear how this criterion should be used 
empirically. Given that different interests are at stake in Design than in Sociology it is also reasonable 
to assume that different classification criteria for practices might validly be used in the two disciplines. 
5 Archaeology provides other ways of conceiving of the meaning of objects, for instance Schiffer’s 
(1999) account of the communicative potential of artefacts. 
